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ABSTRACT
In this paper, the problem of false information injection attack
and defense on state estimation in dynamic multi-sensor sys-
tems is investigated from a game theoretic perspective. The
relationship between the Kalman filter and the adversary can
be regarded as a two-person zero-sum game. Under which
condition both sides of the game will reach the Nash equilib-
rium is investigated in the paper. The multi-sensor Kalman
filter system and the adversary are supposed to be rational
players. The Kalman filter and the adversary have to choose
their respective subsets of sensors to perform system state es-
timation and false information injection. It is shown how both
sides pick their strategies in order to gain more and lose less.
The optimal solutions are achieved by solving the minimax
problem. Numerical results are also provided in order to il-
lustrate the effectiveness of the derived optimal strategies.
Index Terms— Game theory, malicious attack, state esti-
mation, Kalman filter, multi-sensor systems
1. INTRODUCTION
System state estimation in the presence of an adversary that
injects false information into sensor readings is an important
problem with wide application areas, such as target track-
ing with compromised sensors, secure monitoring of dynamic
electric power systems and radar tracking and detection in the
presence of jammers. This topic has attracted considerable
attention and interest recently [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7]. In [1], the
problem of how to take advantage of the power system con-
figuration to introduce arbitrary bias to the system was inves-
tigated. In [2], the authors showed the impact of malicious
attacks on real-time electricity market and how the attackers
can make profit by manipulating certain values of the mea-
surements. The relationship between the attackers and the
control center was discussed in [3], where both the adver-
sary’s attack strategies and the control center’s attack detec-
tion algorithms have been proposed. False data attacks on the
electricity market have also been investigated in [4] and [5].
In [6], the data frame attack was formulated as a quadratically
constrained quadratic program (QCQP). In [7], the relation-
ship between a target and a MIMO radar was characterized
as a two-person zero-sum game. However, in the aforemen-
tioned publications, only the problem of static system state
estimation has been considered.
We are interested in dynamic system state estimation and
in [8], we have studied the impact of the injected biases on
a Kalman filter (KF)’s estimation performance, showing that
if the false information is injected at a single time, its impact
converges to zero as time goes on; if the false information
is injected into the system continuously, the estimation er-
ror tends to reach a steady state. In [9], we have found the
best strategy for the adversary to attack the Kalman filter sys-
tem from the perspective of the trace of the mean squared
error (MSE) matrix, and obtained some close-form results.
We have also studied how the attacker can maximize the de-
terminant of the Kalman filter’s estimation MSE matrix in
[10]. Based on our previous work, in this paper our goal is
to use game theory to investigate the relationship between the
Kalman filter and the attacker. The Kalman filter (the de-
fender) and the attacker are supposed to be rational players.
The trace of the state estimation MSE is used to construct
the payoff matrix, and the problem can be characterized and
solved as a minimax problem. Numerical results show the ef-
fectiveness of the optimal mixed defense strategy for the KF
against the adversary’s attacks.
2. SYSTEM MODEL
The discrete-time linear dynamic system can be described as
xk+1 = Fkxk +Gkuk + vk (1)
where Fk is the system state transition matrix, xk is the sys-
tem state vector at time k, uk is a known input vector, Gk is
the input gain matrix, and vk is a zero-mean white Gaussian
process noise with covariance matrix E[vkvTk ] = Qk. Let
us assume that M sensors are used by the linear system. The
measurement at time k collected by sensor i is
zk,i = Hk,ixk,i +wk,i (2)
with Hk,i being the measurement matrix, and wk,i a zero-
mean white Gaussian measurement noise with covariance ma-
trix E[wk,iwTk,i] = Rk,i, for i = 1, · · · ,M . We further
assume that the measurement noises are independent across
sensors. The matrices Fk, Gk, Hk,i, Qk, and Rk,i are as-
sumed to be known with proper dimensions. For such a linear
and Gaussian dynamic system, the Kalman filter is the opti-
mal state estimator. In this paper, we assume that a bias bk,i
is injected by the adversary into the measurement of the ith
sensor at time k intentionally. Therefore, the measurement
equation becomes
z′k,i = Hk,ixk +wk,i + bk,i = zk,i + bk,i (3)
where z′k,i is the corrupted measurement, bk,i is either an un-
known constant or a random variable independent of {vk,i}
and {wk,i}.
3. IMPACT OF FALSE INFORMATION INJECTION
Let us first assume that the adversary attacks the system by
injecting false information into the sensors while the Kalman
filter is unaware of such attacks. We start with the case where
biases (bk) are continuously injected into the system starting
from a certain time K . Note that single injection is just a
special case of continuous injection when bk are set to be
nonzero at time K and zero otherwise.
In the continuous injection case, the Kalman filter’ extra
mean square error (EMSE), which is caused by the continu-
ous bias injection alone, is derived in [11] and provided as
follows.
Proposition 1. When the bias sequence {bk} is zero mean,
random, and independent over time, the EMSE at time
K + N due to the biases injected at and after time K , de-
noted as AK+N , is AK+N =
∑N
m=0DmΣK+N−mD
T
m,
where Dm =
(∏m−1
i=0 BK+N−i
)
WK+N−m, and BK =
(I−WKHK)FK−1.
∏−1
i=0BK+N−i = I is an identity
matrix,WK is the Kalman filter gain [12], andΣK+N−m is
the covariance matrix of bK+N−m.
In [9], we investigated the optimal attack strategy that an
adversary can adopt to maximize the system estimator’s esti-
mation error. The problem can be formulated as a constrained
optimization problem. Without loss of generality, let us as-
sume that the attacker is interested in maximizing the system
state estimation error at timeK right after a single false bias is
injected at time K . In this case, we are interested in designing
the injected random bias’ covariance matrix such that
max
ΣK
Tr
[
PK|K +AK(ΣK)
]
s.t. Tr(ΣK) = a
2 (4)
where a is a constraint on the power of the injected noise,
Tr(·) is the matrix trace operator, and PK|K is the Kalman
filter’s state covariance matrix at time K in the absence of
any false information. For both the cases where the attacker
injects independent noises and dependent noises to position-
only sensors in an object tracking system, we have derived
the optimal strategies to maximize the trace of the state esti-
mation MSE matrix as provided in the following two propo-
sitions [9].
Proposition 2. For a system with M sensors, if the adver-
sary injects independent random noises, the best strategy is
to allocate all the power to the sensor with the smallest mea-
surement noise variance.
Proposition 3. For a system with M sensors, the optimal
strategy for the adversary is to inject dependent random
noises with a pairwise correlation coefficient of 1. The
noise power is allocated such that σbi = cia√∑M
j=1
c2
j
, i ∈
{1, · · · ,M}, where σbi is the standard deviation (s.d.) of the
noise injected to the ith sensor, ci =
1/σ2wi∑M
j=1
(
1/σ2wj
) , and
σwi is the ith position-only sensor’s measurement noise s.d.
4. A TARGET TRACKING EXAMPLE
In this paper, we give a concrete target tracking example, and
assume that the target moves in a one-dimensional space ac-
cording to a discrete white noise acceleration model [12],
which can still be described by the plant and measurement
equations provided in (1) and (2). In such a system, the state
is defined as xk = [ξk ξ˙k]T , where ξk and ξ˙k denote the tar-
get’s position and velocity at time k respectively. The input
uk is a zero sequence. The state transition matrix is
Fk =
[
1 ∆
0 1
]
∀k (5)
where ∆ is the sensor sampling interval . The process noise is
vk = Γvk, where vk is a zero mean white acceleration noise,
with variance σ2v , and the vector gain multiplying the scalar
process noise is given by Γ =
[
∆2/2 ∆
]T
. The covariance
matrix of the process noise is therefore Q = σ2vΓΓT . The
observation matrix in (2) is given as
Hk,i = [1 0] ∀k, i (6)
Once the system model is known, it is straightforward for both
the Kalman filter and the adversary to calculate the Kalman
filter’s state covariance matrixPK|K as in [12]. Using Prepo-
sition 1, we can obtain the trace of the total state estimation
MSE matrix:
Tr(MSE) = Tr(PK|K +WKΣKWTK) (7)
5. NONCOOPERATIVE TWO-PERSON ZERO-SUM
GAME
In a noncooperative two-person zero-sum game [13], we as-
sume that there are two players, referred to as Players 1 and
2, and an m × n payoff matrix L = {lij}. Each entry of the
matrix is an outcome of the game corresponding to a partic-
ular pair of decisions made by both players. Player 1 gets m
rows of the matrix as his/her strategy set, while for Player 2,
the strategy set is the corresponding n columns of the same
matrix.
In our problem, suppose there are totally M sensors, the
Kalman filter and the adversary can choose any non-empty
subsets of sensors to perform state estimation and attack re-
spectively, which means m = n = 2M − 1. L is a square
matrix of the size (2M − 1) × (2M − 1). The payoff in the
game between the Kalman filter system and the adversary will
be the trace of the state estimation MSE matrix. For each set
of sensors he/she chooses to attack, the adversary is under a
total injected noise power constraint as specified in (4). The
Nash equilibrium between the Kalman filter and the adversary
is achieved by solving the minimax optimization problem.
Let {row i, column j} be a pair of strategies adopted by
the players, and the corresponding outcome (payoff) be lij ,
which means that Player 1 should pay Player 2 the amount
of lij . If li∗j ≤ li∗j∗ ≤ lij∗ , for all i = 1, . . . ,m and all
j = 1, . . . , n, the pair {i∗, j∗} is said to constitute a saddle-
point equilibrium, and the game is said to have a saddle point
in pure strategy. On the other hand, if the pair of inequalities
does not exist, one can derive the mixed strategy to obtain the
equilibrium. A mixed strategy is a probability distribution on
the space of the player’s pure strategies. A mixed strategy
allows for a player to select a pure strategy randomly with
a certain probability. In this case, the utility function u is
defined as
u(x,y) =
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
xilijyj = x
TLy (8)
where x and y are the probability distribution vectors for the
mixed strategies. Also, x ∈ X , y ∈ Y , where the set X =
{x ∈ Rm : x ≥ 0,
∑m
i=1 xi = 1}, and Y is defined in
the same way. The Kalman filter playing as defender is trying
to minimize the utility function u(x,y) by choosing the best
defending strategy, while the attacker wants to maximize the
utility function by choosing the best attack strategy. For the
payoff matrixL of size m×n, a vector of x∗ is the best mixed
strategy for the Kalman filter if
Um(L) = max
y∈Y
(x∗)TLy ≤ max
y∈Y
xTLy,x ∈ X (9)
The Um(L) is known as the average security level (loss ceil-
ing) of the defender, the average security level (gain-floor) of
the attacker Um can also be defined as below,
Um(L) = min
x∈X
xTLy∗ ≥ min
x∈X
xTLy,y ∈ Y (10)
It always holds that Um(L) = Um(L) for mixed strate-
gies in noncooperative two-person zero-sum game. The
saddle point in the mixed strategies is defined when the two
bounds are equal to each other, which can be found by solving
the following linear programming problem [13]:
min
x∈X
bu (11)
s.t. LTx ≤ bu1
xT1 = 1
x ≥ 0
where bu denotes a constant upper bound. For the attacker,
the formula is the other way around,
max
y∈Y
bl (12)
s.t. Ly ≥ bl1
yT1 = 1
y ≥ 0
where bl denotes a constant lower bound. From the formula-
tion above, it is easy to see that (12) is the dual form of the
optimization problem (11). The optimal function for the two
problems are the same. Interested readers are referred to [13]
for more details.
6. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In the example, for simplicity and ease of presentation, we
assume that there are three sensors denoted as {z1, z2, z3}
in the system having independent measurement noises with
noise standard deviations σw1 = 3, σw2 = 4, σw3 = 5. The
system process noise s.d. is σv = 0.5, sensors’s sampling in-
terval is ∆ = 1s, and the system initial state x0 is assumed
to follow a N (xˆ0|0, P0|0) distribution, where xˆ0|0 = [1 1]T
and
P0|0 =
[
0.25 0.25
0.25 0.5
]
.
The adversary can choose any combination of sensors
from the set P1 = {z1, z2, z3, z1z2, z1z3, z2z3, z1z2z3} to
attack with the power constraint of
∑3
1
σbi
2 = 100, where
σbi is the s.d. of the random noise injected to Sensor i. Like-
wise, the defender can choose any combination of sensors
to perform state estimation, and its strategy set is the same:
P2 = P1. The game is played as below: if the defender uses
data from Sensors i and j for state estimation, while the ad-
versary attacks Sensors i and k, then system state estimation
is affected by the false information from the ith sensor only.
In this game, the trace of the state estimation MSE ma-
trix is regarded as the payoff of the game. In the games of
the independent and dependent attacks, the system is attacked
according to the strategies provided in Propositions 2 and 3
Table 1. Payoff Matrix (Independent Case)
KF/At z1 z2 z3 z1z2 z1z3 z2z3 z1z2z3
z1 25.4 4.7 4.7 25.4 25.4 4.7 25.4
z2 7.2 23.5 7.2 7.2 7.2 23.5 7.2
z3 10 10 23.6 10 10 10 10
z1z2 13.5 6.6 3.4 13.5 13.5 6.6 13.5
z1z3 16.4 3.8 5.4 16.4 16.4 3.8 16.4
z2z3 5.0 12.4 8.0 5.0 5.0 12.4 5.0
z1z2z3 10.2 5.2 3.9 10.2 10.2 5.2 10.2
Table 2. Payoff Matrix (Dependent Case)
KF/At z1 z2 z3 z1z2 z1z3 z2z3 z1z2z3
z1 25.4 4.7 4.7 13.2 15.9 4.7 10.3
z2 7.2 23.5 7.2 9.3 7.2 13.3 8.6
z3 10 10 23.6 10 11.0 12.1 10.5
z1z2 13.5 6.6 3.4 16.7 12.4 5.6 15.6
z1z3 16.4 3.8 5.4 15.0 18.1 4.2 15.0
z2z3 5.0 12.4 8.0 6.8 5.3 15.5 8.2
z1z2z3 10.2 5.2 3.9 12.5 11.1 6.2 13.4
respectively. Let us assume that the adversary attacks the sen-
sors at time k = 100, and the payoff matrix is given in Ta-
bles 1 and 2. From Tables 1 and 2, we can see that there
is no pure strategy Nash Equilibrium. Instead, we use mixed
strategies to find the Nash Equilibrium. In order to obtain the
optimal probability distribution vector, we solve the optimiza-
tion problem formulated in (11). The solution to (11) is the
optimal probability vector for the defender, and the dual so-
lution is the optimal mixed strategy for the attacker. The op-
timal solutions for independent- and dependent-attack cases
are shown in Tables 3 and 4 respectively.
For the independent case, we can see from Table 1 that
(6, 6) and (7, 7) elements of the payoff matrix (L) are the
smallest among the seven diagonal elements. This means that
in the worst cases for the KF when its chosen sensor com-
bination happens to be the same as that being attacked by
the adversary, the strategies z2z3 and z1z2z3 will lead to the
smallest state estimation MSEs. In addition, for the KF, the
values of last two rows are relatively small. As a result, for
the KF, the probabilities of the last two strategies (z2z3 and
z1z2z3) are much larger than those of other strategies, which
are shown in Table 3.
In the dependent case, for the KF, the probabilities for the
last two pure strategies (z2z3 and z1z2z3) are relatively large
as shown in Table 4. This can be explained similarly as in
the independent case. In L, the entries of the rows corre-
sponding to z3, z1z2, and z1z3 are relatively large, so the KF
assigns nearly zero probabilities to these three strategies. In
the first two rows of L, even though the diagonal elements are
large, the rest of the elements are relatively small, so strate-
gies z1 and z2 are assigned significant probabilities for the KF
as shown in Table 4.
We also provide a simulation result to demonstrate the op-
timality of the derived strategy. In this example, four different
Table 3. Optimal Strategy Probabilities (Independent Case)
P layer z1 z2 z3 z1z2 z1z3 z2z3 z1z2z3
KF 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.40 0.60
Attacker 0.14 0.22 0.00 0.14 0.14 0.22 0.24
Table 4. Optimal Strategy Probabilities (Dependent Case)
P layer z1 z2 z3 z1z2 z1z3 z2z3 z1z2z3
KF 0.16 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.37 0.33
Attacker 0.14 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.34 0.50
scenarios are explored: 1) there is no attack; 2) the KF uses
the optimal mixed strategy; 3) the KF uses a mixed strategy to
pick each pure strategy with an equal probability 1/7; 4) the
KF always chooses the first pure strategy. In Scenarios 2)-
4), the attacker injects false information according to his/her
optimal mixed strategy to the sensors at time k = 100. The
resulting position estimation MSEs are plotted in Fig. 1. It
is clear that the optimal mixed strategy provides the best de-
fense against the attacker, with the minimum increase in the
MSE after the attack.
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Fig. 1. Optimal Mixed Strategy vs. Other Options
7. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigated the relationship between the
Kalman filter and the adversary in a two-person zero-sum
game. The Kalman filter (defender) tries to achieve more ac-
curate system state estimation and avoid being attacked by
the adversary. The adversary tries to mislead the Kalman fil-
ter as much as possible. Both sides of the game will reach a
Nash Equilibrium through the mixed strategies. Using min-
imax techniques, we found the mixed strategy saddle point
in the game. In the future, we will put more practical con-
straints in our problem by letting both players in the game
have limited information about the other player and introduce
the detection mechanism to the Kalman filter system.
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